USA v. Jesus Zavala-Garcia by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-1-2011 
USA v. Jesus Zavala-Garcia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jesus Zavala-Garcia" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1531. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1531 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 08-1564 
______ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JESUS ZAVALA-GARCIA, 
 
                               Appellant 
______ 
         
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-399-03) 
District Judge: Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo 
______ 
        
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2011 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 1, 2011) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Jesus Zavala-Garcia (“Zavala”) appeals from the District Court’s imposition of a 
36 month sentence following his guilty plea.  Zavala argues on appeal that the District 
Court imposed an unreasonable sentence by failing to consider all of the arguments he 
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made in support of a downward variance and by inadequately explaining its basis for 
their rejection.   
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we recount the facts and proceedings only 
to the extent required for resolution of this appeal.  On November 15, 2007, Zavala 
entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to 
distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 
 After Zavala entered his guilty plea, the probation department prepared a 
presentence report (“PSR”) in which it determined that Zavala accrued four criminal 
history points and therefore fit into Criminal History Category III.
1
  According to the 
PSR, Zavala’s Total Offense Level was 21, which reflected a two level reduction under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) for his minor role in the offense, and a three level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b).  A total of 109 
kilograms of marijuana was attributed to Zavala based on his participation in the 
distribution conspiracy.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  His combined criminal history and 
offense level yielded a Guidelines imprisonment range of 46 to 57 months.   
 Zavala was sentenced on February 19, 2007.  As of the date of sentencing, the 
Government had filed a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 seeking a 10-month downward 
                                              
1
 Zavala received three criminal history points on account of a 2001 conviction for 
forgery, which resulted in a sentence of 65 days’ to 23 months’ of imprisonment.  He 
received one criminal history point for a 1998 conviction for the summary offense of 
harassment. 
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departure based on Zavala’s substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of 
his co-conspirators.  Zavala urged the District Court to vary downward further based on 
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  He presented three arguments in support of 
this request.  First, he argued that his criminal history category overstated the severity of 
his prior crimes.  Zavala asserted that the only reason he was incarcerated rather than 
sentenced to probation for his forgery offense was because he could not afford to post 
bail.  Accordingly, he asked the court to limit consideration of this offense.  Similarly, 
Zavala argued that his harassment conviction merited little consideration because it was 
over ten years old and only resulted in a fine.  Second, Zavala argued that his base 
offense level overstated the seriousness of the instant offense as the 109 kilogram 
quantity of marijuana attributed to him was near the bottom of the 100- to 400-kilogram 
Guidelines range.  Third, Zavala claimed he was merely a “mule”2 and that his co-
conspirators took advantage of him by undercompensating him.  As such, he insisted that 
his offense level overstated the seriousness of his criminal conduct.   
The District Court rejected these arguments and denied Zavala’s request for a 
downward variance.  The District Court did, however, choose to sentence Zavala based 
on the very bottom of the applicable 46 to 57 month Guidelines range.  Thus, after 
granting the Government’s § 5K1.1 motion seeking a 10 month downward departure, the 
District Court imposed a sentenced of 36 months.   
                                              
2
  In drug-drug trafficking parlance, a “mule” is a person who merely transports drugs.  
See United States v. Holman, 168 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Thereafter, Zavala timely appealed.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
“Our responsibility on appellate review of a criminal sentence is limited yet 
important: we are to ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in 
a procedurally fair way.”  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). 
“At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of 
demonstrating unreasonableness.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).  The abuse of discretion standard applies to both inquiries.  Id. 
 Appellate review of a criminal sentence proceeds in two stages.  United States v. 
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 
(2007)).  We first must determine whether the District Court committed a “significant 
procedural error,” for example, by “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors . . . or failing 
to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see United States v. 
Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).   “A sentencing court need not make findings 
as to each factor if the record otherwise makes clear that the court took the factors into 
account.”  United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  Nevertheless, we 
must assure ourselves that the District Court provided an “explanation . . . sufficient for 
us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have been given meaningful 
consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a),”  Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196, and that 
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the sentencing court considered “any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties 
which have recognized legal merit and factual support in the record,” see United States v. 
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
If the District Court’s decision is procedurally sound, we then consider the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  Gall,  552 U.S. at 51.  In reviewing the 
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, “[w]e do not seek to second guess” the District 
Court.  See Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196.  Instead, we seek to ensure that “the record as a 
whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in § 
3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Moreover, we are “highly deferential” to the sentencing court’s 
application of the § 3553(a) factors.  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 
2007).  Accordingly, so long as a sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm “unless 
no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.   
III. 
Zavala argues that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable 
sentence by failing to adequately consider his arguments urging a downward variance 
under § 3553(a) and by failing to sufficiently explain its reasoning for rejecting these 
same arguments.  We disagree.   Although the District Court did not address Zavala’s 
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arguments at length, the record is adequate for appellate review and evinces meaningful 
consideration of his arguments in favor of a downward variance.   
The District Court clearly considered Zavala’s first argument regarding his 
criminal history and adequately explained its decision not to vary downward on this 
ground.  In response to Zavala’s assertion that his prior forgery conviction should receive 
limited consideration, the District Court explained its disagreement by noting that the 
offense involved “just [] not one check . . . [but] three checks from [the] company by 
whom he was employed . . . .”  (App. at 22.)  The District Court went on to explain, “I’m 
not inclined to decrease the seriousness of that offense, so I will not depart based on the 
guideline as far as his criminal history.”  (Id.)  Similarly, the District Court acknowledged 
that the past convictions, including the summary harassment offense, “seem relatively 
minor in terms of both the offense itself and as well as the recency,” but explained, 
“[n]onetheless . . . given that, I think the [criminal history] computation is correct . . . .”  
(Id. at 21.)  Although the court did not specifically reference Zavala’s contention that he 
served time for forgery only due to his inability to post bail, we believe these statements 
in aggregate are sufficient to show meaningful consideration of his argument regarding 
his criminal history.  See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332.  Similarly, we find the explanation for 
rejecting this argument adequate.  See Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196. 
It is also clear from the record that the District Court meaningfully considered 
Zavala’s argument that his offense level overstated the seriousness of his criminal 
conduct and role in the conspiracy.  The District Court explained that “the weights are 
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what the guidelines call for, but both of these factors will be considered by me in starting 
at the low end of the guideline, and the motion for downward departure will be based on 
the low end of that calculation.”   (Id. at 22.)  Similarly, the District Court noted that 
“with regard to his being duped into an offense, the Court did give him a two-level 
reduction for his minor role, so that’s been factored into the sentence.”  (Id. 21-22.)  We 
believe these statements evince meaningful consideration and sufficiently explain the 
District Court’s reasons for not varying downward.3  Accordingly, we reject Zavala’s 
contention that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence.   
To the extent Zavala’s arguments might also be interpreted as a claim that the 
District Court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by refusing his request for 
a downward variance, we similarly reject this argument.  We will affirm a procedurally 
sound sentence as substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
                                              
3
 Zavala insists that he was not actually seeking consideration of his minor role, but rather 
consideration of his status as a “mule” and possibility that he was taken advantage of by 
his co-conspirators because of the nominal pay he received.  As noted earlier, in drug-
drug trafficking parlance, a “mule” is a person who merely transports drugs.  See 
Holman, 168 F.3d at 660.  Although Zavala’s role was minor compared to his co-
conspirators, he nonetheless actively participated in distribution activities.  (PSR ¶¶ 5-8.)  
Thus he cannot credibly claim that he functioned as a “mule.”  Accordingly, the District 
Court was not required to consider this argument.  See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 (“The 
court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly 
without merit.”) (internal citation omitted).  Similarly, the fact that Zavala may have been 
undercompensated for the effort he put into advancing the drug conspiracy is immaterial 
for sentencing purposes.   
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court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Here, the District Court concluded that a 
sentence of 36 months was appropriate in light of Zavala’s criminal history, active role in 
the conspiracy, and the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a).
4
  We are satisfied that 
this sentence resulted from “rational and meaningful consideration of the factors 
enumerated in § 3553(a),” Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (internal quotations omitted), and that it 
is substantively reasonable. 
IV. 
Having found no procedural or substantive error, we will affirm the District 
Court’s conviction and judgment of sentence.  
                                              
4
 Although the District Court only indirectly referenced § 3553(a) when explaining its 
belief that the chosen sentence “[was] sufficient to address his sentencing objectives,” 
(App. at 24 (emphasis added)), we are nonetheless satisfied based on this statement and 
the record as a whole that the District Court meaningfully considered these provisions.  
See United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing 
the § 3553(a) factors as “sentencing objectives”); Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332 (noting that 
“[t]here are no magic words that a district judge must invoke when sentencing”). 
